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Abstract
This paper analyzes the effects of specific and ad valorem taxation in an indus-
try with downstream and upstream oligopoly. We find that in the short run, i.e.
when the number of firms in both markets is exogenous, the results concerning tax
incidence tend to be qualitatively similar to models where the upstream market is
perfectly competitive. However, both over- and undershifting are more pronounced,
potentially to a very large extent. Instead, in the long run under endogenous entry
and exit overshifting of both taxes is more likely to occur and is more pronounced
under upstream oligopoly. As a result of this, a tax increase is more likely to be
welfare reducing. We also demonstrate that downstream and upstream taxation are
equivalent in the short run while this is not true for the ad valorem tax in the long
run. We show that it is normally more efficient to tax downstream.
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1 Introduction
Indirect taxes are a major source of revenue for governments. For example, in the EU 27
in 2007, the sum of revenue from commodity taxes and value-added taxes was 1,204.5 Bill.
Euros which is around 12.5% of GDP in these countries.1 In the U.S. the revenue from
sales taxes are somewhat lower but they are still important, e.g. they account for 15% of
total tax revenue on the state level.2 Moreover, both commodity and value-added taxes
have risen dramatically over the last decades.3 It is also likely that indirect taxation may
increase further in many countries to finance a planned reduction in income taxes. For
example, in the U.S. in 2005 the Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform viewed a value-
added tax as worthy of discussion and a recent report to Congress proposed it as new
source of revenue.4 Therefore, to understand and evaluate the effects of indirect taxation
is important both for consumer surplus and overall welfare.
To make progress in this direction, the recent literature on indirect taxation compared
the effects of unit and ad valorem taxes under oligopoly due to the fact that many in-
dustries exhibit an oligopolistic structure. This literature considers an oligopoly only in
the downstream market. Such a partial analysis is justified if the input price does not
change with a change in tax rates. This would appear to be a good approximation to
real world industries if upstream markets are close to perfectly competitive. However, in
many industries the upstream market is highly concentrated with few large manufacturing
firms. Consider for example the markets for soft drinks and milk products (e.g. yoghurt
or ice cream). Here, a few producers supply almost the whole market. Therefore, they
enjoy market power vis-a´-vis retailers. Retailers in turn are often highly concentrated in
a region, thereby exerting market power vis-a´-vis final consumers.5
1See Eurostat, Statistical books, Government finance statistics 1/2008.
2The exact revenue is $73.96 Bill. on a federal level and $106.07 Bill. on a state level. (Federal data
stem from CBO, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2009 to 2018, January 2008, Table F-3,
available at: http://www.cbo.gov/. State level data stem from U.S. Census Bureau, State Government
Tax Collections: 2006, available at: http://www.census.gov/.)
3For example, in Germany the value-added tax increased from 11% in 1976 to 19% in 2007 (see
www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase) and e.g. the tax for unleaded gasoline increased from around 24.5 Euro-
cent per liter in 1985 to around 66.9 Eurocent in 2008 (see http://www.bwl-bote.de/20070723.htm).
4See J.M. Bickley, CRS Report for Congress, Value-Added Tax: A new U.S. revenue source, August
2006.
5Another striking example is the market for microprocessors in the personal computer industry. Almost
all of the supply in this market stems from just two firms (Intel Corp. and AMD, Inc.). The downstream
market consisting of computer manufacturers is in turn an oligopoly with around five firms controlling
most of the market in many countries.
1
More importantly, products that are subject to a product specific tax in addition to
the general value-added or sales tax typically have the feature that the upstream mar-
ket is highly concentrated. Examples are alcoholic beverages, tobacco products, vehicles
or gasoline.6 For instance, consider the beer brewing industry and the associated retail-
ing market. Both are currently highly concentrated in the U.S. and this concentration
increased steadily over the last decades.7 Beer is taxed both with a specific and an ad
valorem tax in all U.S. states.8 These taxes have been increased over the last years, espe-
cially in 1991 when the federal unit tax doubled. In light of these facts it is very unlikely
that a change in the excise tax leads to a change only in the consumer price but leaves
the input price constant. A similar development can be observed in the UK. Here the
upstream market is very concentrated as well, e.g. in 2000, five national brewers produced
90% of beer volumes.9 Due to mergers there are currently even fewer beer producers and
Heineken, Carlsberg and Guinness control most of the market. Similar to the U.S., the
excise duty in the UK increased by a large amount, namely from 3.1 pence per pint of beer
in 1973 to 34.0 pence in 2008.10,11
To understand the effects of a change in indirect taxes, it is inevitable to take into
account how these taxes affect the intermediate product price, which in turn can have
profound consequences on the produced quantity and the final consumer price. The goal
of this paper is to explicitly model the upstream market and take strategic interaction
between firms in the upstream and the downstream market into account. Such models
6Historically, an excise was levied on these goods because they were seen as luxury goods. Nowa-
days, these taxes still exist for environmental and consumer protection reasons. A modern ex-
ample of a luxury tax is Canada’s tax of C$150 on each air conditioning unit in vehicles (see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taxation in Canada).
7Rojas (2008) reports that the number of mass-producers decreased from 350 in 1950 to 24 in 2000
making it one of the most concentrated industries in the United States. A similar pattern but with a
somewhat larger number can be observed in the retailing industry.
8In 2003, the unit tax on beer has yield a revenue of $5.6 Bill. and the ad valorem tax on beer one
of $16.8 Bill. See ”The Tax Burden on the Brewing Industry”, Report prepared by Global Insight, Inc.
and The Parthenon Group (2005). In general the total spending on beer in 2003 was $78.1 Bill. where
breweries contributed 34.72% and retailers 49.63%.
9See Mintel International Group Ltd., Ales and Stouts (2000).
10See British Beer and Pub Association Statistical Handbook 2007, updates by Institute for Alcohol
Studies 2008, available at: http://www.ias.org.uk/.
11A similar market structure can be observed in the industry for tabacco products. For example, in
the U.S. the Herfindahl index in the cigarette manufacturing industry in 1997 was 3100 as compared to
an average of 91 for manufacturing industries (see U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Census, available
at: http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/m31s-cr.pdf). Excise tax increases were also large and increasing,
e.g. in the years from 2000 until 2008 in the states New Jersey and Montana the excise duty per package
increased by $1.775 and $1.52, respectively.
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come under the name of vertical oligopoly and we will refer to such industries as two-layer
industries. In particular, we are interested in comparing the effects in two-layer industries
with those of perfect competition upstream to find out if models that take the input
price as given may err, and if so, what the direction of this difference is and under which
conditions this difference is particularly large. As far as we are aware of, this paper is the
first contribution that looks into the effects of indirect taxation in vertical oligopoly.
In this set-up of vertical oligopoly it is also natural to go beyond previous analyzes and
explicitly differentiate between upstream and downstream taxation. This distinction is
important since taxes on the same product can be levied on different layers in production.
For example, in the U.S. sales taxes are charged at the final consumer market while ex-
cise duties for alcoholic beverages and cigarettes are charged at the intermediate product
market. Our analysis allows an answer to the question at which level taxation is more
efficient.
To fix ideas, we consider an industry consisting of an imperfectly competitive upstream
and downstream market, i.e. a two-layer industry. There is an ad valorem and a specific
tax on the final product.12 At each layer firms compete a` la Cournot with homogeneous
products: downstream firms set quantities non-cooperatively taking the input price as
given. Taking the reactions of downstream firms into account, upstream firms set their
quantities non-cooperatively. Quantity competition with homogeneous products appears
to be the natural starting point for the analysis of indirect taxation in oligopoly. Indeed,
most of the literature supposes Cournot competition in the downstream market as well.13
This allows us to directly compare our results with previous work where the input price
is assumed to be constant in the tax rate. We also note that the modern industrial
organization literature has not come up with tractable models of vertical oligopoly where
firms offer differentiated products.14
12For example, in the U.S. both forms of taxes are levied on several products including ve-
hicles and gasoline while, for instance, in China beer and yellow spirits are taxed at a per
unit rate while white spirits and other alcoholic drinks are taxed at a percentage rate (see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tax system in China).
13The exceptions are the papers by Anderson et. al (2001a, 2001b). They find that for symmetric firms
the implications of excise taxes under price competition are similar to those under quantity competition.
Hamilton (2008) also considers price competition but with multi-product firms. He shows that the results
in this case are markedly different to those under price or quantity competition with single-good firms.
14The problem is to find a satisfactory model to express how differentiated upstream firms compete
when their consumers consist of a finite number of downstream firms that value their inputs in a different
way and compete with each other.
3
In this set-up, we consider the short-run when the numbers of firms in the upstream
and the downstream market are given and the long-run when the number of firms is en-
dogenously determined through entry and exit at both layers. We are especially interested
if and how our findings differ from an industry in which the upstream price is constant.
We refer to such an industry as a one-layer industry.
We obtain the following results: We first demonstrate that in our setting in the short-
run downstream taxation is equivalent to upstream taxation. We also show that an ad
valorem tax is equivalent to a value-added tax. Thus, our analysis holds for a value-added
tax as well. Our main result under short-run competition concerns over- and undershifting,
i.e. if an increase in the tax rate is passed on to consumers by more or less than 100%. We
obtain that the predictions on over- or undershifting of the two forms of taxes, specific and
ad valorem, tend to be qualitatively similar in a two-layer industry to those in a one-layer
industry, corroborating earlier results for one-layer industries. However, the parameter
ranges for over- and undershifting do not necessarily coincide. In the case of two widely-
used classes of demand functions, we show that both over- and undershifting are amplified
in vertical oligopoly, possibly to a very large extent. This result is in line with empirical
findings that even shortly after a tax increase consumer prices increase by more than 100%
or even 200% of the tax increase.15 The reason is that if overshifting occurs, the price-cost
margin in the downstream market increases. In this case, firms in the upstream market
have an incentive to participate in this increase and lower their quantity, and vice versa
if undershifting occurs. Thus, the direction is the same as in a one-layer industry but the
results are exacerbated. We also demonstrate that the difference between the results for
the one- and two-layer industry increases if the upstream market becomes less competitive
and (for most cases) if demand is more elastic.
In the long-run, i.e. with free entry, results in vertical oligopoly differ sharply from
those with perfect competition upstream. Our main result under long-run competition is
that overshifting is more likely and occurs to a larger degree. Thus, consumers are likely
to bear a larger fraction of the tax burden. The intuition is that as a consequence of a tax
15For example, Rojas (2008) documents that in the first quarter after the tax increase in the beer
industry in the U.S. in 1991 the price increase for different beer segments was from around 85% to 230%
larger than the actual tax increase. Besley and Rosen (1999) also find a price increase for products like
shampoo and bread that are around 100% and 240% larger than the tax rise. For further evidence on
overshifting see also Harris (1987) on the U.S. cigarette industry, Karp and Perloff (1989) on the Japanese
television industry and the references in the survey on tax incidence by Fullerton and Metcalf (2002).
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increase, firms exit in the upstream market, thereby leading to an increase in the input
price that is further shifted to consumers by firms at the downstream layer. As a result
of this effect, the introduction of a commodity tax is less likely to be welfare enhancing
in vertical oligopoly. Thus, governments considering an increase in commodity tax rates
are likely to underestimate the negative effect that this change may have on consumer
surplus and general welfare when ignoring the effects on input prices. We also find that
this underestimation tends to be large if competition in the downstream and the upstream
market is small and (for most cases) if the demand curve is relatively elastic. We further
show that even in the long-run an ad valorem tax and a value-added tax are equivalent and,
therefore, our results hold for a value-added tax as well. Yet, a downstream ad valorem tax
is no longer equivalent to an upstream ad valorem tax in the long-run. We demonstrate that
downstream ad valorem taxation dominates upstream ad valorem taxation from a welfare
perspective although the latter may induce a smaller price increase for final consumers.
The existing literature on commodity taxation under imperfect competition starting
with the papers by Kay and Keen (1983), Stern (1987) and Besley (1989) focussed almost
exclusively on the final consumer market. The first systematic comparison between specific
and ad valorem taxes in a Cournot oligopoly is provided by Delipalla and Keen (1992).
They provide conditions for overshifting of the two taxes and show the superiority of ad
valorem taxation compared to specific taxation both in the short and long run.16 The
downstream market in our analysis is modelled in the same way as in Delipalla and Keen
(1992) but, as mentioned above, in contrast to their analysis we do not keep the input price
fixed and instead allow for changes both in the input price and in the number of upstream
firms. The only papers that explicitly take the upstream market into account are Konishi
(1990), Hamilton (1999b) and Asker (2008): Konishi (1990) considers a model with an
oligopolistic downstream market and several perfectly competitive upstream markets. He
allows for entry and exit downstream and restricts the tax policy to consist of a lump-
sum tax downstream and specific taxes on inputs and the final product. Konishi (1990)
16The model by Delipalla and Keen (1992) has been extended in several ways. For example, Skeath and
Trandel (1994) provide conditions under which ad valorem taxation Pareto dominates specific taxation
and Hamilton (1999a) generalizes the analysis to allow for comparisons between less familiar forms of
taxation. Anderson et al. (2001a, 2001b) show under which conditions the results concerning tax incidence
and efficiency of the Cournot model carry over to a differentiated Bertrand model and point out possible
differences in the results. Hamilton (2009) develops a model with differentiated Bertrand competition in
which firms can offer multiple products. He analyzes how the conclusions concerning overshifting and
efficiency have to be modified compared to the single-product case.
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shows that in this set-up the first-best can be achieved by a positive lump-sum tax and
a specific final product subsidy while the input specific taxes are zero. If lump-sum taxes
are not feasible, taxation and subsidization of inputs is optimal instead. Hamilton (1999b)
compares tax efficiency between monopoly and monopsony. In particular, he compares the
case of upstream monopoly and perfect downstream competition with the one of perfect
competition upstream and downstream monopsony. He shows that in the latter case a
specific tax welfare-dominates an ad valorem tax while the opposite holds true for the
former case. Asker (2008) analyzes a market with a downstream monopolist and a fixed
number of upstream producers that compete to serve the monopolist via a first-price
auction.17 He compares different forms of taxes (or subsidies) on the input price and
finds that overshifting is likely to arise under very general demand conditions. In contrast
to these papers we consider an industry with an oligopoly structure both upstream and
downstream, analyze the comparison between specific, ad valorem and value-added taxes
and compare the results to the ones obtained for perfect competition upstream.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next Section sets out the model and
characterizes the short-run equilibrium. In Section 3 we consider the effects of taxation in
the short run. We analyze tax incidence under the two forms of indirect taxes and compare
our results to the results that obtain in one-layer industries. In Section 4 we address the
same issues in the long run, when firms can enter and exit the industry. We also analyze
the efficiency of a tax policy and point out differences between taxation downstream and
upstream. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model and equilibrium characterization
We consider a two-layer industry with an upstream and a downstream market. In the
upstream market M ≥ 1 symmetric firms produce a homogeneous intermediate product
at constant marginal costs c > 0. In the downstream market, the intermediate product
constitutes an input and N ≥ 1 symmetric firms transform the input in constant pro-
portions into a homogeneous final product at constant marginal costs. To simplify the
exposition, marginal costs of downstream firms are set equal to zero. Without loss of
generality, downstream firms need one unit of input for one unit of output. For instance, if
17Producers differ with respect to their marginal costs and their fixed costs. In addition, fixed costs are
uncertain and after realization, only firms with low enough fixed costs enter the bidding.
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downstream firms are retailers, this naturally holds. In the short run, the number of firms
is exogenous in the upstream and downstream market.18 The inverse demand function for
the final product is denoted by p(Q), with p′(Q) < 0 and Q =
∑n
i=1 qi. For simplicity, we
assume that p(Q) is thrice continuously differentiable and that c > limQ→∞ p(Q). Some
shape assumptions on p(Q) are spelled out below.
Firms play a two-stage game in the short-run. At the first stage, upstream firms play a
Cournot game, i.e. each firm chooses its profit-maximizing quantity taking its competitors’
outputs as given. The market-clearing input price (from the point of view of downstream
firms), denoted by r, is determined by equating the total amount of output supplied
by the upstream firms with the demand of the downstream firms. At the second stage,
downstream firms compete a` la Cournot in the final product market taking the input price
that was determined at the previous stage as given.19 The equilibrium concept is subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium.
There are two different forms of taxes. The first is a specific tax t ≥ 0 per unit sold. The
second is an ad valorem tax τ under which the downstream producer price is (1− τ)p(Q),
where τ ∈ [0, 1].
Solving the game by backward induction we can write the profit function of downstream
firm i as
Πi(qi, Q−i) = qi ((1− τ)p(Q)− r − t) ,
where Q−i = Q− qi. The resulting first-order condition of profit maximization is
∂Πi
∂qi
= (1− τ)p(Q)− r − t+ (1− τ)qip′(Q) = 0.
Noting that at a symmetric equilibrium we have qi = q = Q/N ∀i ∈ [1, ..., N ], the first-
order condition can be rewritten to get
r = (1− τ)p(Q)− t+ (1− τ)Qp
′(Q)
N
. (1)
18In Section 4, the game is modified in a straightforward way to allow for entry and exit.
19In line with much of the previous literature on vertical oligopolies, e.g. Greenhut and Ohta (1979),
Salinger (1988) and Ghosh and Morita (2007), downstream firms do not have market power in the upstream
market. This property approximately holds if the upstream sector serves a large number of independent
downstream markets so that a quantity change by a firm in one of these downstream markets has a
negligible effect on the price of its input. One example are a large number of local retail markets that are
served by the upstream firms and whose demand is independent of one another. To make the property
hold exactly, we have to assume that upstream firms sell to a continuum of (identical) downstream sectors.
In the remainder of this paper we consider one such representative downstream sector.
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We need to make sure that the solution to the first-order condition uniquely determines
Q. Since r ≥ c > 0, aggregate equilibrium quantity is finite for all t ≥ 0, τ ∈ [0, 1] at any
viable price of the intermediate product. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: (N + 1)p′(Q) +Qp′′(Q) < 0.
Assumption 1 is a key condition for existence and uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium
(see e.g. Vives (1999)): it guarantees that the solution to (1) is unique and, thus, that
the inverse demand function faced by the upstream firms is unique as well. To make sure
that the unique solution to (1) is indeed a maximizer for each downstream firm given
Q−i = [(N − 1)/N ]Q we assume that Q/N = argmaxqi Πi(qi, [(N − 1)/N ]Q), where Q
solves (1).20
Using (1) we can derive the profit function of upstream firm j. Denote the aggregate
quantity produced by the upstream firms as X, where X =
∑M
j=1 xj and X−j = X − xj
and note that in equilibrium Q = X. Thus, the profit function of upstream firm j can be
written as
Πuj (xj, X−j) = xj
(
(1− τ)
(
p(X) +
Xp′(X)
N
)
− t− c
)
. (2)
This yields the first-order condition
∂Πuj
∂xj
= (1− τ)
[
p(X) +
Xp′(X)
N
+ xjp
′(X)
1 +N
N
+
xjXp
′′(X)
N
]
− t− c = 0.
Using the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium Mxj = Nqi = Q, we can conclude that
aggregate quantity in this two-layer industry under specific and ad valorem taxation is
given by
(1− τ)
[
p(Q⋆) +
Q⋆p′(Q⋆)
N
+
(1 +N)Q⋆p′(Q⋆)
NM
+
(Q⋆)2p′′(Q⋆)
NM
]
− t− c = 0. (3)
In any interior equilibrium (3) has to be satisfied. To make sure that such a solution
exists and is unique, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: (N + 1)(M + 1)p′(Q) + (N +M + 3)Qp′′(Q) +Q2p′′′(Q) < 0.
Assumption 2 is the counterpart to Assumption 1 for the upstream market. To make
the problem interesting we must also have that limQ→0(1−τ)p(Q)−t > c because otherwise
20For a related discussion see Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) and Gaudet and Salant (1991).
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no firm would produce a positive quantity. Finally, we have to assume that each upstream
firm’s profits are in fact maximized at Q⋆/M given X−j = [(M − 1)/M ]Q⋆, i.e. Q⋆/M =
argmaxxj Π
u
j (xj, [(M − 1)/M ]Q⋆).
Lemma 1 For any taxes t and τ such that limQ→0(1 − τ)p(Q) − t > c, there exists a
unique symmetric equilibrium with aggregate quantity Q⋆ > 0 which is the solution to (3).
In the following we occasionally consider two frequently used parametric specifications
of demand to illustrate some of our results. The first specification is a generalization of
the linear demand function while the second one exhibits the property of constant returns
to scale (CES demand function).
Example 1 p(Q) = 1 − Qb. Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied for b > 0. Equilibrium
final-product price and equilibrium quantity are given by
p∗ ≡ p(Q∗) = 1− MN((1− τ)− t− c)
(1− τ)(N + b)(M + b) (4)
and
Q∗ =
(
MN((1− τ)− t− c)
(1− τ)(N + b)(M + b)
) 1
b
.
Example 2 p(Q) = Q−b. Here, assumptions 1 and 2 are satisfied for min{M,N} > b > 0.
Equilibrium final-product price and equilibrium quantity are given by
p∗ ≡ p(Q∗) = MN(t+ c)
(1− τ)(N − b)(M − b)
and
Q∗ =
(
MN(t+ c)
(1− τ)(N − b)(M − b)
)
−
1
b
. (5)
Before starting with the analysis two important remarks are in order.
Remark 1 Value-added tax (VAT)
In our two-layer industry it is of particular interest to analyze the consequences of a VAT,
especially given its prevalence in many countries. Here we point out that our following
analysis for the ad valorem tax encompasses the case of a VAT since both taxes are
equivalent. To see this suppose that the government sets a VAT of τ . The profit function
of a downstream firm is then given by
Πi(qi, Q−i) = qi ((p(Q)− r) (1− τ)− t), (6)
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which after maximizing yields
r = p(Q) +
Qp′(Q)
N
− t
1− τ . (7)
The profit function of upstream firm j is then given by
Πuj (xj, X−j) = xj
(
(1− τ)
(
p(X) +
Xp′(X)
N
)
− t− c
)
.
But this profit function is the same as (2). Therefore, the equilibrium quantity is the same
under ad valorem and under VAT given by (3) and the comparative statics with respect
to τ are also the same.21,22
Remark 2 Downstream vs. Upstream Taxation
We set up the model by restricting taxation to occur downstream. Yet, all of our results
are valid if the commodity is taxed in the upstream market. To see this suppose that
ad valorem and unit tax are charged in the upstream market. The profit function of a
downstream firm i is then given by
Πi(qi, Q−i) = qi (p(Q)− r) , (8)
Maximizing and rearranging yields
r = p(Q) +
Qp′(Q)
N
. (9)
The profit function of an upstream firm j then reads as
Πuj (xj, X−j) = xj
(
(1− τ)
(
p(X) +
Xp′(X)
N
)
− t− c
)
.
But obviously this is the same profit function as with taxation in the downstream market.
Therefore, the equilibrium Q is again given by (3) and the comparative static results on t
and τ are the same as in our analysis.23
21Here we suppose that the upstream sector is the first layer in the production chain. Thus, a VAT is the
same as a revenue tax in this sector. If the upstream sector was an intermediate stage in the production
chain, the VAT would be only a profit tax and therefore would have no distorting effects. But since there
is always a starting layer in the production chain, the equivalence of VAT and ad valorem tax holds also
when considering more than just two layers in the production chain.
22The equivalence between ad valorem taxation and VAT carries over to a setting with downstream
marginal costs different from zero (presuming that either the VAT does not apply to these costs (e.g.
labor costs) or that the costs arise from other inputs whose net price is constant in VAT-rates).
23The equivalence is less general if we allow for positive marginal costs in the downstream market. Here,
the equivalence holds only if the these downstream costs are due to some other input that is taxed at the
same rate or if variable input costs can be deducted downstream.
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3 Short-run effects of indirect taxation in vertical oligopoly
In this section we investigate the effects of unit and ad valorem taxes in the short run.
We analyze under which conditions overshifting of each of the two taxes occurs. We are
especially interested if and how these conditions might differ compared to an analysis which
neglects strategic interaction in the upstream market and takes the upstream price as given.
This corresponds to an industry in which the upstream market is perfectly competitive
and firms have constant marginal costs. We also show under which circumstances these
differences are especially pronounced. Furthermore, we briefly look at optimal taxes.
Tax Incidence
The study of tax incidence concerns the possibility of over- and undershifting. Over-
shifting under the unit tax occurs if and only if the retail price net of taxes (the pro-
ducer price) increases with the unit tax, i.e., if d(p⋆(1 − τ) − t)/dt > 0 or, equivalently,
(1− τ) (dp⋆/dt) > 1. Similarly, overshifting under the ad valorem tax occurs if and only if
d (p⋆(1− τ)− t) /dτ = (dp⋆/dτ) (1−τ)−p⋆ > 0. Undershifting occurs if “>” is replaced by
“<”. To save on notation in the following we abbreviate p(Q⋆) by p and p′(Q⋆) by p′. Anal-
ogously, for higher order derivatives. To shorten expressions, we define ǫ = −Q⋆p′/p > 0
as the elasticity of the inverse demand function, E = −Q⋆p′′/p′ as the elasticity of the
slope of the inverse demand function and F = −Q⋆p′′′/p′′ as the elasticity of the curvature
of the inverse demand function.
Proposition 1 (i) The specific tax leads to overshifting if and only if
NM
(N + 1)(M + 1)− E(N +M + 3) + EF > 1. (10)
(ii) The ad valorem tax leads to overshifting if and only if
NM − ǫ((N +M + 1)− E)
(N + 1)(M + 1)− E(N +M + 3) + EF > 1. (11)
(iii) Overshifting of the ad valorem tax implies overshifting of the specific tax.
As Delipalla and Keen (1992) show, overshifting of the specific tax implies overshifting
of the ad valorem tax when only considering the downstream market. As part (iii) of
Proposition 1 demonstrates, this result carries over to vertical oligopoly.24
24An empirical study by Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001) on the European cigarette industry for the years
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We now take a closer look at the overshifting results (i) and (ii) and compare the effects
of excise taxes in an industry with perfect competition in the upstream market (one-layer
industry) to the ones that occur in vertical oligopoly (two-layer industry).
We ask two questions: First, when does overshifting in a one-layer industry imply
overshifting in our two-layer industry and when does the reverse implication hold? Second,
how strong is the over- or undershifting? So we are interested in determining if there
are different predictions concerning tax policy in industries where the market structure
upstream is oligopolistic to those with perfect competition upstream. Thereby we also
provide an answer to the question how, and to which extent, models err that, for simplicity,
take the input price as given and therefore independent of the tax rate. In the following we
denote the respective price, quantity, derivatives of the demand function and elasticities
in a one-layer industry with a subscript o.
As established by Delipalla and Keen (1992), in a one-layer industry overshifting of the
specific tax occurs if
N
N + 1− Eo > 1 (12)
or, equivalently, Eo > 1, while overshifting of the ad valorem tax occurs if
N − ǫo
N + 1− Eo > 1
25 (13)
or, equivalently, Eo > 1 + ǫo.
26 We can now compare these results with the condition for
overshifting in a two-layer industry.
Proposition 2 (i) Specific tax: If
EF > E(M +N + 3)− Eo(M +N + 1),
then overshifting of the specific tax in a two-layer industry implies overshifting in a one-
layer industry and vice versa.
(ii) Ad valorem tax: If
EF > E(M +N + 3 + ǫ)−
(
1 +
ǫ
ǫo
(Eo − 1)
)
(M +N + 1),
1982-1997 confirms this result. They demonstrate that an increase in the specific tax had a significantly
larger effect on price than an increase in the ad valorem tax. On average, the ratio of specific tax effect
to ad valorem tax effect is around 1.4.
25As can be checked from (10) and (11), both conditions are obtained in our model in the limit as
M →∞ because the upstream market becomes perfectly competitive then.
26As in the two-layer industry, ǫo = Q
⋆
o
p′
o
/po and Eo = Q
⋆
o
p′′
o
/p′
o
, where po and its derivatives are
evaluated at Q⋆
o
.
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then overshifting of the ad valorem tax in a two-layer industry implies overshifting in a
one-layer industry and vice versa.
This result can be explained as follows: As can be seen from (12) and (13), when
considering only the final consumer market, overshifting occurs if Eo is relatively large,
i.e. the second derivative of the inverse demand curve is positive and sufficiently large. In
a similar way, if an additional layer is taken into account, the price in this layer increases
with a tax increase if the third derivative is positive and large enough. Since EF = p′′′/p′,
a large third derivative implies that EF is highly negative because p′ < 0. As Proposition
2 shows, if EF is below a certain threshold, overshifting in a one-layer industry implies
overshifting in a two-layer industry, i.e. overshifting is more likely to occur in a two-layer
industry than in a one-layer industry. Thus, when comparing the two market structures,
overshifting of taxes to final consumers is increased if the third derivative is sufficiently
large, so that upstream oligopoly amplifies the overshifting effect.
The proposition shows that the overshifting result in an industry where the input price
is fixed can be misleading when applied to an industry with imperfect competition in
the upstream market. This is important when considering the effects of a change in the
government’s tax policy. A government that ignores the fact that the upstream market is
imperfectly competitive and thus ignores the effect of a tax change on the input price, will
make wrong predictions concerning the allocative effects of a change in tax policy.
To shed some further light on how the results differ between one- and two-layer indus-
tries we take a look at the parametric demand functions from Examples 1 and 2. Note that
the class of demand functions given by Example 1 exhibits the property that cost shifters
are passed on to consumers by less than unity, while the opposite holds true for the class of
demand functions given by Example 2 (see e.g. Weyl (2008)). Thus, undershifting always
occurs in the first class of demand functions and overshifting in the second class. When
taking into account imperfect competition in the upstream market, the qualitative predic-
tions concerning over- or undershifting remain valid in these two examples. However, as
the next proposition shows, both become more pronounced in a two-layer industry.
Proposition 3 (i) If p(Q) = 1−Qb, undershifting of both the unit tax and the ad valorem
tax is larger in a two-layer industry than in a one-layer industry.
(ii) If p(Q) = 1/Qb, overshifting of both the unit tax and the ad valorem tax is larger in a
two-layer industry than in a one-layer industry.
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With the help of a numerical example we illustrate that differences can be substantial.
Suppose that parameter values are N = 5, M = 3 and b = 1. Then, for p(Q) = 1 − Q
(special case of example 1) we obtain (dp⋆o/dt)(1− τ)− 1 = −1/6 in a one-layer industry
while (dp⋆/dt)(1−τ)−1 = −3/8 in a two-layer industry. Hence, the extent of undershifting
is more than doubled after taking into account imperfect competition in the upstream
market. With the demand specification p(Q) = 1/Q (special case of example 2) we obtain
(dp⋆o/dt)(1 − τ) − 1 = 1/4 in a one-layer market while (dp⋆/dt)(1 − τ) − 1 = 7/8 in a
two-layer market. Thus, ignoring imperfect competition in the upstream market would
predict an overshifting of 25% while the correct number is 87.5%.
Note that in the classes of parametric demand functions given by Examples 1 and
2 the sign of the second and third derivative often point in the same direction and, if
not, their difference is small.27 So, if there is overshifting which implies that the price-
cost margin at the downstream market increases, the equilibrium reaction of firms in the
upstream market is to reduce their quantity so that their price-cost margins increase as
well. The opposite holds true for undershifting. As a consequence, in our two examples the
qualitative result concerning over- or undershifting in the downstream market is essentially
robust to imperfect competition in the upstream market. However, taking into account
imperfect competition in the upstream market amplifies the degree of over- or undershifting
and is thus important for evaluating quantitative effects of tax changes on final product
prices and consumer surplus.
It is of interest under which conditions the mistake that results from ignoring the
downstream market is particularly large. This is important because when evaluating the
effects of an increase in excise taxes for a particular industry, one needs to know if an
estimation that concerns only the downstream market is sufficient in practice. Moreover,
since the mistake can be large, one must distinguish between different industries to find
out if a similar tax increase may have different consequences.
With the help of the two parametric families of demand functions we investigate the
role of the elasticity parameter b and the number of firms in each layer, N and M : How
does b, N and M affect the difference in the marginal response of price to the tax rate
between a one- and a two-layer industry?
27They generally point in the same direction for the demand function p(Q) = 1/Qb. For the function
p(Q) = 1−Qb this is true if b > 2 while for b ≤ 2 the difference between the two is small.
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Proposition 4 (i) If p(Q) = 1−Qb, both∣∣∣∣dp⋆odt − dp
⋆
dt
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣dp⋆odτ − dp
⋆
dτ
∣∣∣∣
are increasing in b if and only if b <
√
NM . Both are increasing in N and decreasing in
M .
(ii) If p(Q) = Q−b, both ∣∣∣∣dp⋆odt − dp
⋆
dt
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣dp⋆odτ − dp
⋆
dτ
∣∣∣∣
are increasing in b, decreasing in N and decreasing in M .
Let us explain these comparative static results: For demand functions of the form
p(Q) = 1 − Qb, the difference between the effects in a one- and two-layer industry is
maximal if b takes some intermediate value. The reason is that if b is either close to zero
or very large, the demand function is very flat or steep and the effect of upstream oligopoly
compared to perfect competition is only small, since the curvature of the demand function
dominates all other effects. The second finding, namely that the difference between a
one- and a two-layer market increases in N , appears to be surprising at first glance. If
the downstream market becomes perfectly competitive, the difference is most pronounced.
The intuition is that as long as the demand function is not perfectly inelastic (which is
not the case here), undershifting gets the larger, the larger the number of downstream
firms. This effect is more pronounced the larger the amount of undershifting. Since this
amount is larger in a two-layer industry, the difference increases. Finally, the finding that
the difference decreases in M is not surprising, since in the limit as M → ∞ one- and
two-layer industry are the same. Therefore, the result only establishes monotonicity, i.e.
the difference is monotonically decreasing in M .
For demand functions of the form p(Q) = Q−b, the result concerning the elasticity
parameter b is similar to the case above. If b is close to zero, the elasticity of the demand
function dominates all other effects and therefore the difference is small. Yet, here b is
restricted to be smaller than the minimum of N andM to ensure a unique interior solution.
Thus, it cannot become too large and for all admissible values of b we obtain that the
difference is still increasing. With respect to an increase in N , overshifting becomes less
and less pronounced, and this is even more so the higher the degree of overshifting. Since
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overshifting is larger in two-layer industries than in one-layer industries this difference
decreases in N . The comparative static effects with respect to M are the same as in the
other example.
To summarize the results of this subsection, we provide conditions on the shape of the
demand curve such that the effects of specific and ad-valorem tax in a two-layer industry
are qualitatively the same as those in a one-layer industry. As illustrated by two parametric
examples, although the qualitative results are similar, the effects are amplified in a two-
layer industry, possibly to a large extent. Thus, when neglecting the interaction of the
final product market with the input market, a tax policy underestimates the effects of a
tax change. In Section 4 we will show that in the long-run results in two-layer industries
are markedly different from those in one-layer industries.
Tax Efficiency
We now shortly compare the two taxes with respect to their efficiency properties. What
is the welfare maximizing tax policy if the government wants to raise a given tax revenue
with the two indirect taxes? Here our answer is unambiguously in favor of using the ad
valorem tax. In Appendix B we show that to raise a given amount of tax revenue it is
optimal to do that exclusively with the ad valorem tax and to set the unit tax to zero. In
other words, for a welfare-maximizing government the ad valorem tax is the more efficient
one. This finding corroborates previous findings that were obtained in one-layer industries
(see e.g. Delipalla and Keen (1992) or Anderson et al. (2001b)). It essentially shows that
the structure of the optimal tax policy is robust to imperfect competition in the upstream
market in the short run. The ad valorem tax distorts final output by less than the specific
tax.
We can also consider what is the optimal corrective tax to restore the efficient outcome.
Since imperfect competition leads to price above marginal costs, it is obvious that a policy
of subsidization is optimal for both the unit and the ad valorem tax. It is easy to calculate
that the optimal amount of the unit tax is
t =
Q⋆(p′(1 +N +M) +Q⋆p′′)
NM
< 0
given that the ad valorem tax is zero and, likewise, the optimal amount of the ad valorem
tax is
τ =
Q⋆(p′(1 +N +M) +Q⋆p′′)
cNM +Q⋆(p′(1 +N +M) +Q⋆p′′)
< 0,
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given that the unit tax is zero.28
4 Long-run effects of indirect taxation in vertical oligopoly
In this section, we no longer treat the number of firms as given. Instead, there is a large
number of firms, which can be active or inactive. Firms at both layers adjust via the
process of entry and exit to the tax regime. To capture the result of this process of entry
and exit the number of active firms (as sellers) is determined by the zero-profit condition
in each layer. We refer to this as the long-run analysis. We denote the cost of being
active as a seller in the downstream market by Fd and in the upstream market by Fu. The
game now consist of three stages, and we solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of this game. At the first stage, each firm decides to be active in the upstream or in the
downstream market or to be inactive. If a firm enters as a seller, it bears the respective
fixed cost which is sunk at this stage. In line with most of the literature, we treat the
numbers of firms in both layers as a continuous variable.29 The second and third stages
play out exactly as before. Given the number of entering firms, at the second stage, each
upstream firm chooses its profit-maximizing quantity taking the quantity of its rivals as
given, and, at the third stage, each downstream firm chooses its profit-maximizing quantity
taking the quantity of its rivals as given.
The long-run equilibrium: Preliminaries
Since the last two stages are the same as in the short run analysis, the aggregate
quantity for a given number of active firms N⋆ and M⋆ is, as above, given by
(1− τ)
[
p(Q⋆) +
Q⋆p′(Q⋆)
N⋆
+
(1 +N⋆)Q⋆p′(Q⋆)
N⋆M⋆
+
(Q⋆)2p′′(Q⋆)
N⋆M⋆
]
− t− c = 0. (14)
At the first stage, firms enter at both layers so that profits are zero, i.e., in a symmetric
equilibrium N⋆ and M⋆ are jointly determined by the equations
Q⋆((1− τ)p(Q⋆)− r − t)
N⋆
= Fd,
X⋆ [(1− τ) (p(X⋆)N⋆ +X⋆p′(X⋆))−N⋆(t+ c)]
M⋆N⋆
= Fu,
28The inequality follows from the fact that (3) must still hold at p(Q) = c. Therefore, the numerator is
negative while the denominator is positive.
29See e.g. Besley (1989), Delipalla and Keen (1992), and Anderson et al. (2001a, 2001b). This not
only simplifies the analysis but also avoids non-monotone comparative statics that would stem from the
discreteness of the number of firms.
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and
X⋆ = Q⋆.
Using first-order conditions of profit maximization at stages 2 and 3, the first two
equations can be rewritten as
−(1− τ)
(
Q⋆
N⋆
)2
p′(Q⋆) = Fd (15)
and
−(1− τ) (Q
⋆)2
N⋆(M⋆)2
((N⋆ + 1)p′(Q⋆) +Q⋆p′′(Q⋆)) = Fu. (16)
The equilibrium Q⋆, M⋆, and N⋆ under free entry in both layers are characterized by the
solution to the system of the three equations (14), (15) and (16).
Before starting the analysis let us make two remarks.
Remark 1B VAT
From Remark 1 we know that the aggregate quantity is the same for a VAT and an ad
valorem tax of τ , given the number of firms is fixed. To demonstrate this equivalence
in the long-run as well we have to show that the same number of firms enter upstream
and downstream, i.e. that profits under both tax regimes are the same. Yet, this can be
easily checked using Remark 1. Inserting (7) into (6) gives that the profit of a downstream
firm under VAT is the same as in (15), the profit of a downstream firm under ad valorem
taxation, given the number of upstream firms. But from Remark 1 we already know that
the profit function of an upstream firm is the same under both forms of taxes. Thus, the
number of entering upstream firms is also the same. As a consequence, ad valorem tax
and value-added tax are equivalent in the long run as well.
Remark 2B Upstream vs. Downstream Taxation
As in Remark 1B, we have to check if the number of firms may differ when taxation is set
upstream instead of downstream. Interestingly, here this is the case for the ad valorem
tax but not for the unit tax. This can be seen from Remark 2. Using (8) and (9) yields
that the profit of a downstream firm is given by
−
(
Q
N
)2
p′(Q) = Fd (17)
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instead of −(1−τ) (Q⋆/N⋆)2 p′(Q⋆) = Fd, which is the relevant equation under downstream
taxation. The equations determining the number of upstream firms and the aggregate
quantity are still given by (14) and (16). Thus, if τ = 0, the equilibrium is the same.
Therefore, setting a unit tax upstream or downstream is equivalent. But for τ > 0 the
profit function for downstream firms differ which leads to a different N⋆ and thereby also
to a different M⋆ and Q⋆. We will provide a comparison between ad valorem taxation
upstream and downstream concerning incidence and efficiency at the end of this Section.
Tax Incidence
We first analyze whether and under which conditions the specific or the ad valorem tax
leads to overshifting. Note that now firms adjust their participation decision to changes
in the tax rates.30
Proposition 5 (i) Overshifting of the specific tax under free entry occurs if and only if
4NM
4NM − 2− E2 − E(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2EF > 1. (18)
(ii) Overshifting of the ad-valorem tax under free entry occurs if and only if
4NM − ǫ(1 + 2N + 2M) + Eǫ
4NM − 2− E2 − E(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2EF > 1. (19)
(iii) Overshifting of the ad-valorem tax implies overshifting of the specific tax.
The result is similar to the one in the short run where overshifting of the ad valorem tax
also implies overshifting of the specific tax. Again, it is of particular interest to compare
these conditions with the ones in a one layer industry. From work by Besley (1989) and
Delipalla and Keen (1992) we know that overshifting of the unit tax in a one-layer industry
occurs if
2No
2No − Eo > 1 (20)
or, equivalently, Eo > 0, where No denotes the equilibrium number of downstream firms
in a one-layer industry. Likewise, overshifting of the ad valorem tax occurs if
2No − ǫo
2No − Eo > 1 (21)
or, equivalently, Eo > ǫo.
30To abbreviate notation here and in the following we omit the superscript ⋆ at the equilibrium numbers
of firms, N⋆ and M⋆.
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Proposition 6 (i) Specific tax: If
EF >
1
2
(2 + E2),
then overshifting of the specific tax in a two-layer industry implies overshifting in a one-
layer industry and vice versa.
(ii) Ad valorem tax: If
EF >
1
2
[
E(1 + 2N + 2M + E + ǫ) + 2− Eo ǫ
ǫo
(1 + 2N + 2M)
]
,
then overshifting of the ad valorem tax in a two-layer industry implies overshifting in a
one-layer industry and vice versa.
At a first glance, these results may look similar to the ones of Proposition 2 concerning
the short-run comparison between a one- and a two-layer industry. Yet, the results are
very distinct. Let us explain this with the example of the specific tax. In the short run,
the threshold value for EF is given by E(M +N + 3)−Eo(M +N + 1). But the only ex
ante information we have on E and Eo stems from Assumptions 1 and 2 and restricts p
′′
not to be too large. Thus, E and Eo are either negative or not too positive but we have
no restriction on how they might differ. Thus, the sign of the threshold value can either
be positive or negative. As we have shown for our two examples in Proposition 3, both
over- and undershifting can be more pronounced in a two-layer market. Instead looking
at the condition in the long run, it is easy to see that the threshold 1/2(2+E2) is strictly
positive. We find that only if EF is large and positive, then overshifting in a two-layer
industry implies overshifting in a one-layer industry. But if EF is not highly positive,
the reverse holds true. As a consequence, overshifting in the long run occurs for a larger
set of demand functions in a two-layer industry than in a one-layer industry. A similar
observation can be made for the ad valorem tax; the effects are somewhat weaker but are
qualitatively the same.31
The intuition behind the result is the following: A tax increase reduces profits of the
downstream firms. Therefore, under free entry, fewer downstream firms enter. This leads
to reduced supply in the final product market and therefore demand on the intermediate
31This can be seen in the easiest way by supposing that both ǫo ≈ ǫ and Eo ≈ E. Then, the threshold
value can be written as 1/2(2 + E2 + ǫE). Thus, it consists of two positive and one indeterminate term.
As a consequence, if EF is not overly large, overhifting occurs for a larger parameter range in a two-layer
industry than in a one-layer industry (for a properly chosen parametric family of demand functions).
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product market decreases as well. But this lowers the profits of the upstream firms. Thus,
fewer of them enter. As a consequence, upstream firms have more market power and
restrict their quantities further to keep the intermediate product price high. This in turn
leads to higher final product prices. As a result, a model that neglects the reaction of
input prices to a tax change normally underestimates the effects of a tax increase on the
price increase in the long run. It may predict undershifting when indeed overshifting takes
place or underestimates the extent of overshifting.
It is instructive to see how these effects play out in the two classes of demand function
we introduced above. We can partly use the previous proposition to show the following
result:
Proposition 7 (i) If p(Q) = 1 − Qb, then for both, the specific and the ad valorem tax,
overshifting in a two-layer industry occurs for a larger set of parameters than in a one-
layer industry.
(ii) If p(Q) = 1/Qb, then for both, the specific and the ad valorem tax, the extent of
overshifting in a two-layer industry is larger than in a one-layer industry.
Hence, in contrast to the short run where the effects of both over - and under shift-
ing are more pronounced in a two layer industry, in the long run overshifting is always
underestimated when neglecting the upstream market.
As in the short-run, we can analyze under which conditions the difference between a
one- and a two-layer industry is particularly large. Yet, this is more complicated in the
long-run since the number of firms is endogenous in both industries. Solving explicitly
for the number of firms in a two-layer industry is possible only for special cases of the
demand functions since the zero profit conditions are often nonlinear in the number of
firms. For that reason, we confine our analytical results to the simpler demand functions
p(Q) = 1 − Q and p(Q) = 1/Q, the special case of b = 1 in the demand functions of the
Examples 1 and 2, respectively.32
Proposition 8 (i) If p(Q) = 1−Q, both∣∣∣∣dp⋆dt − dp
⋆
o
dt
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣dp⋆dτ − dp
⋆
o
dτ
∣∣∣∣
32In fact, in this case the second demand function allows for an explicit solution for the number of firms
in both markets. With the first one, this is still impossible but we can apply the implicit function theorem.
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increase in Fd and in Fu.
(ii) If p(Q) = 1/Q, both ∣∣∣∣dp⋆dt − dp
⋆
o
dt
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣dp⋆dτ − dp
⋆
o
dτ
∣∣∣∣
increase in Fd and in Fu.
Most of these results parallel those that were obtained in the short-run analysis and the
intuition was already given there. The exception is that the difference in absolute values
for the demand function p(Q) = 1−Q increases in Fd. In the short-run we obtained that
this difference is increasing in N while here it is increasing in Fd and therefore decreasing
in N . In the short run, this function implied undershifting in both industries. Instead,
in the long-run for b = 1 overshifting occurs, and, as explained after Proposition 4, this
becomes more pronounced the smaller is N .
Since for tractability reasons we restrict our analysis to the case in which b = 1 in
both functions, we cannot obtain analytical comparative static results concerning b. Yet,
we did simulations to draw some conclusions about the effects of a change in b. Here we
find similar results to the ones obtained in the short-run, i.e. that for p(Q) = 1 − Qb
the absolute difference between one- and two-layer industry is first increasing and then
decreasing in b while for p(Q) = 1/Qb it is always increasing in b. Thus, short-run and
long-run effects do not differ qualitatively in this respect.
To sum up, a tax policy that concentrates on the final products market is likely to err
in the extent of the tax incidence. In the long-run, not only downstream firms but also
upstream firms exit the market in response to a tax increase, and this has a detrimental
effect on consumer surplus.
Tax Efficiency
As in the short run, we can analyze which tax is more efficient in the long-run. As
shown in Appendix B, we find that the ad valorem tax is the more efficient tax in the long
run as well. Thus, we confirm that the result obtained by Delipalla and Keen (1992) for a
fixed intermediate product price also holds if price and entry in the intermediate product
market are endogenous. In contrast to the short-run our result is less obvious here. The
reason is the following: In a one-layer industry, there is socially excessive entry.33 The ad
33The result of socially excessive entry in Cournot industries with a fixed intermediate good price has
been shown by e.g. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987).
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valorem tax now has the advantage to reduce profits and thereby the number of firms to
a larger extent than the specific tax. Since this saves entry costs, it is socially desirable.
This is not necessarily true anymore once we allow for free entry in the upstream market.
In this case, even in the absence of taxation, insufficient entry at the two layers may occur,
as shown by Ghosh and Morita (2007). The reason is that the surplus that arises when
an additional upstream firm enters is in part captured as profit by the downstream firms.
Therefore, an upstream firm receives less than the total surplus as profit and so insufficient
entry may occur. A similar reasoning holds for downstream entry. Since the ad valorem
tax reduces profits by more than the unit tax, a shift from the unit to the ad valorem
tax leads to less entry which can be detrimental to welfare. Yet, our result shows that
this effect can never dominate. Although entry might be insufficient, the fact that the
distortive effect of an ad valorem tax is smaller than the one of a specific tax dominates.
It is also of interest to analyze under which conditions the introduction of a positive
tax rate increases welfare compared to a one-layer industry. Here we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 9 (i) Specific tax: If EF > 1/2(2 + E2), then an increase in welfare by the
introduction of a small specific tax (conditional on τ = 0) occurs in a two-layer industry
only for a subset of demand functions compared to a one-layer industry and vice versa.
(ii) Ad valorem tax: If EF > 1
2
[E(1 + 2N + 2M + E + ǫ) + 2 − Eoǫ/ǫo(1 + 2N + 2M)],
then an increase in welfare by the introduction of a small ad valorem tax (conditional on
t = 0) occurs in a two-layer industry only for a subset of demand functions compared to a
one-layer industry and vice versa.
The thresholds given in the proposition are the same as the thresholds in Proposition
6. The reason is that overshifting of the specific or the ad valorem tax implies that its
introduction reduces welfare (given that the other tax is zero). This holds for both, a
one- and a two-layer industry. Given our previous results, the proposition implies that
the introduction of a specific or an ad valorem tax reduces welfare for a larger range of
parameters when taking the upstream market into account. The intuition is also easy to
grasp from the previous results. Since a reduction in overall quantity is more likely in a
two-layer industry, the introduction of a tax is more likely to have a detrimental effect
on welfare. The implication for policy makers when considering the introduction of such
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a tax in a particular industry is therefore to have a clear picture about the competitive
environment in the upstream market. If the effects in the upstream market are ignored,
the consequences after the introduction may turn out to be undesirable.
Taxation in the Upstream Market
As shown in Remark 2B, if the ad valorem tax is set upstream instead of downstream
the profit of downstream firms is no longer directly affected by τ and, therefore, the
equilibrium allocation is different. In this subsection we compare now ad valorem taxation
upstream with ad valorem taxation downstream. This is, in general, not an easy task since
the equilibrium number of firms is endogenous and different in the two regimes. Still, we
can draw some conclusions. We start by looking at a price change in response to the
introduction of a small ad valorem tax.
Proposition 10 At τ = 0, the introduction of a small ad valorem tax in the downstream
market increases p⋆ by more than the introduction of an ad valorem tax in the upstream
market.
The intuition is clear: if an ad valorem tax is introduced downstream, the profit of
downstream firms decreases by more than if the tax is introduced upstream, since the
profit is directly affected by the tax. Since an upstream firm’s profit is given by the same
formula in both regimes, the consequence is that the quantity decrease resulting from
downstream taxation is larger. Thus, the price increase is larger as well.
Note that the result of Proposition 10 is also valid for a perfectly competitive upstream
market since the zero profit condition in the downstream market is still different under
both scenarios, independent of the degree of competition upstream. Yet, as the next
proposition shows for analytically tractable cases of our examples, the effects are weaker
if the upstream market is perfectly competitive.
Proposition 11 For the demand functions p(Q) = 1−Q and p(Q) = 1/Q the difference
between the price increase resulting from an ad valorem tax downstream versus upstream
is larger in a two-layer industry than in a one-layer industry.
Thus, when the upstream market becomes perfectly competitive the difference between
upstream and downstream taxation is smaller (although not eliminated). The intuition is
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that a competitive upstream market dampens a price increase in general but this effect
becomes more important the larger the price increase.
Finally, we analyze if ad valorem taxation upstream or downstream is more efficient.
To do so, we restrict attention to the demand function p(Q) = 1/Q because it allows us
to solve for the equilibrium number of firms at both layers, and thus to compare welfare
under the two regimes analytically.
Proposition 12 Suppose that p(Q) = 1/Q. Then for any upstream ad valorem tax, there
exists a downstream ad valorem tax that is more efficient.
This result shows that although the price increase is larger when the ad valorem tax is
charged downstream than upstream, welfare under a downstream ad valorem tax is higher.
The intuition behind this result is the following: As explained above, under upstream
taxation more downstream firms enter. Thus, aggregate entry costs are higher. Moreover,
the tax revenue of upstream taxation is smaller if the tax rates were the same, since in
the upstream market the tax revenue is a fraction of the aggregate quantity times the
upstream price r(Q). In contrast, under downstream taxation the tax revenue is a fraction
of the aggregate quantity times the downstream price p(Q) > r(Q). Of course, to induce
the same aggregate quantity, the downstream ad valorem tax rate must be lower than the
upstream one. However, this effect is smaller than the ones described above.
For tractability reasons, we could only provide the welfare result for the function
p(Q) = 1/Q. To check if the result also holds for more general functions, we did nu-
merical calculations for the CES demand functions with b 6= 1 and also for the function
p(Q) = 1− Qb. We found in all our calculations that for any upstream ad valorem tax a
more efficient downstream ad valorem tax exists. Thus, our result seems to hold for more
general demand functions than just the one we can provide an analytical result for.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the effects of indirect taxation in an industry with upstream oligopoly,
and, in particular, compared the results to previous models that presume a perfectly
competitive upstream market. We first demonstrated that, in our setting, in the short-run
a VAT is equivalent to an ad valorem tax and that upstream and downstream taxation
are also equivalent. We then showed that the results concerning over- or undershifting are
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qualitatively similar in a one- and in a two-layer industry but can be much larger in a
two-layer industry. This is different in the long-run. There, overshifting is more likely in a
two-layer industry and is also more pronounced. Thus, final consumers bear more of the
tax burden when explicitly taking into account entry and exit in the upstream market.
This also makes the introduction of any tax less likely to be welfare enhancing. Finally,
we showed that in the long-run ad valorem taxation downstream is different to ad valorem
taxation upstream, and proved in a specific setting that the first one is welfare superior.
A possible limitation of our analysis is that we only considered the case of Cournot
competition in both layers. As mentioned in the introduction, the reason is that the indus-
trial organization literature has only started to analyze alternative models of competition
in the context of vertical oligopoly, namely Cournot oligopoly with supply constraints and
price competition with differentiated products. However, without having worked out the
mathematics of these alternative models, our conjecture is that our qualitative findings
with respect to overshifting in the long-run are confirmed. The reason is the following:
as a tax increase leads to lower profits of firms, exit will happen in the upstream and
the downstream market of the industry. Thus, the input price in the downstream market
rises and overshifting becomes more likely and/or occurs to a larger extent in a two-layer
industry compared to a one-layer industry. This effect is independent of the specifics of the
model of imperfect competition. Similarly, the superiority of introducing an ad valorem
tax downstream instead of upstream relies on the savings of entry costs and the higher
tax revenue that is due to the fact that the downstream price is larger than the interme-
diate product price. Again, this intuition does not rely on the specific model of imperfect
competition.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1
Due to the boundary properties any solution must be an interior solution and by con-
tinuity, there must exist a solution Q⋆ to (3). Uniqueness of a symmetric solution follows
because Assumption 2 implies that the term in square brackets in (3) is monotone in Q.
By assumption, each firm’s profits are maximized given the choices of the other firms. 
Proof of Proposition 1
By the implicit function theorem, differentiating (3) with respect to Q and t and noting
that dp⋆/dt = p′(dQ⋆/dt) yields after rearranging
dp⋆
dt
=
NM
(1− τ) [(N + 1)(M + 1)− E(N +M + 3) + EF ] . (22)
Overshifting occurs if (1− τ) (dp⋆/dt) > 1. Inserting (22) then yields (10).
Overshifting of the ad valorem tax occurs if (dp⋆/dτ)(1 − τ) − p⋆ > 0. Calculating
d (p⋆(1− τ)) /dτ and rearranging then yields the result in (11).
Finally, to show that overshifting of the ad valorem tax implies overshifting of the
specific tax, note that, by Assumption 1, N +M + 1 − E > 0. As a consequence, the
left-hand side of (10) is strictly larger than the one of (11) which implies the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2
On (i): After rewriting (10) we get that overshifting of the specific tax in a two-layer
industry occurs if34
p′(M +N + 1) +Qp′′(M +N + 3) +Q2p′′′ > 0, (23)
while from (12) we can deduce that overshifting in a one-layer industry occurs if p′o+Qop
′′
o >
0. Multiplying the last inequality by (M + N + 1)p′/p′o > 0 and rewriting it yields
(M +N + 1)p′(1−Eo) > 0. Subtracting the left hand side of the last inequality from the
34To safe on notation in the following we omit the superscript ⋆ at Q and Qo. As mentioned above,
p and all derivatives of p are evaluated at the equilibrium Q⋆. Likewise, po and all derivatives of po are
evaluated at the equilibrium Q⋆
o
.
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left hand side of (23) yields
p′ (E(F − (M +N + 3)) + Eo(M +N + 1)) .
If this expression is negative and there is nevertheless overshifting in the two-layer industry,
this must imply that p′o +Qop
′′
o > 0, i.e. overshifting in a one-layer industry. Rearranging
p′ (E(F − (M +N + 3)) + Eo(M +N + 1)) < 0 yields EF > E(M + N + 3) − Eo(M +
N + 1), which yields the desired result. Reversely, in the same way we can show that for
EF < E(M +N + 3)−Eo(M +N + 1) overshifting of the unit tax in a one-layer market
implies overshifting in a two-layer market.
On (ii): From (13) we know that overshifting of the ad valorem tax in a one-layer
industry occurs if p′o(Qop
′
o − po) − Qopop′′o > 0 while from (11) overshifting in a two-layer
industry occurs if
p′(M +N + 1)(Qp′ − p)−Qpp′′(M +N + 3) +Q2(p′p′′ − pp′′′) > 0.
Nowmultiplying the left hand side of the first of these inequalities by (M+N+1)(p′/p′o)
2Q/Qo >
0 and subtracting it from the left hand side of the second inequality yields, after rearrang-
ing,
−p′(M+N+1)p−Qpp′′(M+N+3)+Q2(p′p′′−pp′′′)+(M+N+1)po
(
Q
Qo
(p′)2
p′o
+Qp′′o
(p′)2
(p′o)
2
)
.
If this expression is negative but there is overshifting in the two-layer industry, this
implies necessarily overshifting in a one-layer industry. After dividing last expression
by pp′ < 0 and rearranging we find that this is case if EF > Et(M + N + 3 + ǫ) −
(1 + ǫ/ǫo(Eo − 1)) (M +N + 1). Correspondingly, the reverse holds true if EF < E(M +
N + 3 + ǫ)− (1 + ǫ/ǫo(Eo − 1)) (M +N + 1). 
Proof of Proposition 3
On (i): If p(Q) = 1−Qb, the equilibrium price in a two-layer industry is from (4) given
by
p⋆ = 1− MN((1− τ)− t− c)
(1− τ)(N + b)(M + b) .
Hence, the equilibrium price in a one layer market po is
p⋆o = lim
M→∞
(
1− MN((1− τ)− t− c)
(N + b)(M + b)
)
= 1− N((1− τ)− t− c)
(1− τ)(N + b)
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Differentiating both expression with respect to t and substracting the resulting derivative
in the two-layer industry from the one in a one-layer industry gives
dp⋆o
dt
− dp
⋆
dt
=
N
(1− τ)(N + b)
(
1− M
M + b
)
> 0. (24)
Therefore, undershifting in a two-layer industry takes place to a larger extent. Conducting
the same analysis for the ad valorem tax, we get
dp⋆o
dτ
− dp
⋆
dτ
=
N(t+ c)
(1− τ)(N + b)
(
1− M
M + b
)
> 0. (25)
On (ii): If p(Q) = 1/Qb, we have
p⋆o =
N(t+ c)
(1− τ)(N − b) and p
⋆ =
MN(t+ c)
(1− τ)(N − b)(M − b) .
Consequently,
dp⋆o
dt
− dp
⋆
dt
=
N
(1− τ)(N − b)
(
1− M
M − b
)
< 0 (26)
and
dp⋆o
dτ
− dp
⋆
dτ
=
N(t+ c)
(1− τ)(N − b)
(
1− M
M − b
)
< 0. (27)

Proof of Proposition 4
On (i): From (24) and (25) it is evident that the sign of the derivatives of dp⋆o/dt−dp⋆/dt
and dp⋆o/dτ − dp⋆/dτ with respect to b, N , and M is the same since (dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt) (t+
c) = dp⋆o/dτ − dp⋆/dτ . Differentiating with respect to b then yields
∂ (dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt)
∂b
=
N(MN − b2)
(1− τ)(N + b)2(M + b)2 .
Since dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt > 0, the absolute value of the difference is increasing in b as long as
b <
√
NM .
Differentiating with respect to N and M yields
∂ (dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt)
∂N
=
b2
(1− τ)(N + b)2(M + b) > 0
and
∂ (dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt)
∂M
= − Nb
(1− τ)(N + b)(M + b)2 < 0.
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On (ii): As above, from (26) and (27) it is evident that (dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt) (t + c) =
dp⋆o/dτ − dp⋆/dτ and therefore the sign of the derivatives of dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt and dpo/dτ −
dpt/dτ with respect to b, N , and M is the same. Differentiating with respect to b then
yields
∂ (dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt)
∂b
= − N(NM − b
2)
(1− τ)(N − b)2(M − b)2 .
Since dp⋆o/dt − dp⋆/dt < 0, the absolute value of the difference is increasing in b as long
as b <
√
NM . But because b < min{N,M}, we know that b < √NM for all admissible
values of b.
Differentiating with respect to N and M yields
∂ (dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt)
∂N
=
b2
(1− τ)(N − b)2(M − b) > 0
and
∂ (dp⋆o/dt− dp⋆/dt)
∂M
=
Nb
(1− τ)(N − b)(M − b)2 > 0.
Since dp⋆o/dt−dp⋆/dt < 0, the absolute value of the difference is decreasing both in N and
M . 
Proof of Proposition 5
Totally differentiating (14), (15) and (16) and solving the resulting system of equations
for dq⋆/dt, dN⋆/dt and dM⋆/dt yields
dq⋆
dt
= − 2QMp
′′
(1− τ) [(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)] ,
dN⋆
dt
=
2M(2p′ +Qp′′)
(1− τ)Q [(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)] , (28)
and
dM⋆
dt
=
M2N (−2(1 + 2N)(p′)2 − p′Q(p′′(2N + 5) + 2Qp′′′) +Q2(p′′)2)
(1− τ)Q
× 1
[(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)] . (29)
From this we can calculate dp⋆/dt to get
dp⋆
dt
= p′
dQ⋆
dt
= p′
(
dq⋆
dt
N +
dN⋆
dt
q
)
=
4NM(p′)2
(1− τ) [(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)] > 0 (30)
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which, after using that Q = Nq and inserting the respective expressions for E and F ,
simplifies to
dp⋆
dt
=
4NM
(1− τ) (4NM − 2− E2 − E(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2EF ) > 0. (31)
Since overshifting occurs if (dp⋆/dt)(1− τ) > 1, (18) follows.
The expression for overshifting of the ad valorem tax can be calculated in exactly the
same way to get
dq⋆
dτ
= − Q ((1− 2NM)(p
′)2 − p′p′′′Q2 + 2pp′′NM + (p′′)2Q2)
(1− τ)N [(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)] ,
dN⋆
dτ
=
N (2Q(1 +M +N −MN)(p′)2 + p′(p′′Q2 + 4pM − p′′′Q3) + (p′′)2Q3 + 2QMpp′′)
(1− τ)Q [(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)]
(32)
and
dM⋆
dτ
=
φ
(1− τ) (33)
× 1
[(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)]
with
φ ≡ (p′)3(1 + 2N)(MN −M −N − 1)
+(p′)2
(
p′′(MN − 2M − 3N − 2M)Q− p′′′Q2M − 2pM(1 + 2N))
−p′ (−(p′′)2Q2(M − 1) + p′′pMN(2N + 5) + 2p′′′pQNM)+ p′′QNpM.
Using these expressions we obtain
dp⋆
dτ
=
(p′)2 (p′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 4pM + p′′Q2)
(1− τ) [(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)] > 0. (34)
Since overshifting occurs if (dp⋆/dτ)(1− τ) > p⋆, we obtain, after rearranging,
(p′)2 (4NMp+Qp′(2M + 2N + 1) + p′′Q2)
p [(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)] > 1
which yields (19).
Finally, comparing the left hand side of (18) with the left hand side of (19) yields that
the latter is smaller than the former if ǫ (−(1 + 2N + 2M) + E) < 0 which is fulfilled since
ǫ > 0 and p′(1 + 2N + 2M) +Qp′′ < 0 by Assumption 1. This shows that overshifting of
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the ad valorem tax implies overshifting of the specific tax. 
Proof of Proposition 6
On (i): Rewriting (18) yields that overshifting in a two-layer industry occurs if
2(p′)2 +Q2(p′′)2 − p′ (p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′) > 0. (35)
From (20) overshifting in a one-layer industry occurs if p′′o > 0 which, after multiplying
by −p′Qp′′/p′′o(1 + 2N + 2M) > 0, can be written as −p′Qp′′(1 + 2N + 2M) > 0. Now
subtracting the left hand side of the last inequality from the left hand side of (35) yields
after rearranging 2(p′)2 + Q2(p′′)2 − 2Q2p′p′′′. If this expression is smaller than zero but
there is still overshifting in the two-layer industry, this necessarily implies that there is over
shifting in the one-layer industry. Rearranging the expression 2(p′)2+Q2(p′′)2−2Q2p′p′′′ <
0 yields that this is the case if EF > 1/2(2+E2). Proceeding in the same way to identify
the condition under which overshifting in a one-layer market implies overshifting in a two
layer market gives EF < 1/2(2 + E2).
On (ii): From (21) overshifting occurs in a one-layer industry if p′′opo − (p′o)2 > 0 while
from (19) overshifting occurs in a two-layer industry if
((p′)3 − pp′p′′)Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + (p′)2(2p+Q2p′′)− 2pp′p′′′Q2 + p(p′′)2Q2 > 0. (36)
Multiplying the first inequality by −(1 + 2N + 2M)Q(p′)3/(p′o)2 > 0 yields
−(1 + 2N + 2M)Q (p
′)2
(p′o)
2
p′p′′opo + (1 + 2N + 2M)Q(p
′)3 > 0.
Now subtracting the left hand side of the last inequality from the left hand side of (36),
dividing by (pp′)2 > 0 and rearranging gives[
E(1 + 2N + 2M + E + ǫ) + 2− Eo ǫ
ǫo
(1 + 2N + 2M)
]
− 2EF.
If this expression is negative, overshifting of the ad valorem tax in a two-layer industry
implies overshifting in a one-layer industry. Rearranging yields that this is the case if
EF >
1
2
[
E(1 + 2N + 2M + E + ǫ) + 2− Eo ǫ
ǫo
(1 + 2N + 2M)
]
.
Correspondingly the reverse holds true if the inequality is reversed. 
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Proof of Proposition 7
On (i): We start with the specific tax. Inserting the demand function p(Q) = 1 − Qb
into (18) and (20), one can easily show that there exists for both the one- and the two-layer
industry, respectively, a unique threshold of b below which overshifting occurs. From the
last Proposition we know that if EF < 1/2(2+E2), then overshifting in a one-layer industry
implies overshifting in a two-layer industry. With p(Q) = 1−Qb this is equivalent to the
statement that if we have EF < 1/2(2 + E2) at the threshold for the one-layer industry,
then overshifting in a two-layer industry occurs for a larger set of b than in a one-layer
industry. Reformulating this condition to
Q2p′′′
p′
<
1
2
(
2 +
(
Qp′′
p′
)2)
and inserting the specific demand function yields (b − 1)(b − 2) < 1 + (b − 1)2/2 or
b2 − 4b + 2 < 0. From (20), we know that overshifting in a one-layer industry occurs if
p′′o > 0. Thus, the threshold of b in a one-layer industry is b = 1. But at b = 1 the
inequality b2− 4b+2 < 0 is fulfilled. This implies that overshifting in a two-layer industry
occurs also for values of b > 1 which proves the result.
Now let us turn to the ad valorem tax. As before, one can easily show from (19)
and (21) that in case of p(Q) = 1 − Qb there exists a unique threshold of b below which
overshifting occurs both in a one- and in a two-layer industry, respectively. The last
Proposition showed that for
EF <
1
2
[
E(1 + 2N + 2M + E + ǫ) + 2− Eo ǫ
ǫo
(1 + 2N + 2M)
]
overshifting in a one-layer industry implies overshifting in a two-layer industry. Rewriting
this condition yields
(p′)2
(
2 +Q2
p′′
p
)
−p′p′′Q(1+2N+2M)−2p′p′′′Q2+(p′′)2Q2+Q(1+2N+2M)p
′
p
(p′)2
(p′o)
2
p′′opo > 0.
Inserting the respective demand function and rearranging yields that the sign of the left
hand side of the last inequality is given by
sign
{
Qbo
[
(1− 3b)Qb + 2(1− b)(N +M) + b(3− b)]−Qb(1− b)(1 + 2N + 2M)} .
Rearranging this yields
sign
{
Qbo
[
(1− 3b)Qb + b(3− b)]−Qb(1− b) + 2(Qbo −Qb)(1− b)(2N + 2M)} .
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We know that Qbo > Q
b. Moreover, overshifting in a one-layer industry occurs only if
Eo > ǫo which implies for the respective demand function that b < 1−Qbo. Therefore, b < 1
in the relevant parameter range and so the last term of the above expression is positive.
Since we want to show that overshifting occurs for a larger range of b in a two-layer industry
than in a one-layer industry, this is equivalent to show that the sign of the last expression
is positive at b = 1−Qbo. Inserting b = 1−Qbo into Qbo
[
(1− 3b)Qb + b(3− b)]−Qb(1− b)
and rearranging yields Qbo(1 − Qbo)(2 + Qbo − 3Qb). But since Qbo < 1 and Qbo > Qb, this
term is strictly positive, which proves the result.
On (ii): With this demand function we cannot use the results obtained in the last
Proposition because there is overshifting both in a one-layer and in a two-layer industry.
We therefore continue by directly comparing the price changes induced by a tax change.
Again, we start with the specific tax. Inserting the demand function and its derivatives
into dp⋆/dt and dp⋆o/dt yields
dp⋆
dt
=
4NM
(1− τ)(4NM − 2(1 + b)(N +M) + b(3 + b)) and
dp⋆o
dt
=
2No
(1− τ)(2No − 1− b) .
Subtracting the latter from the former and rearranging gives
sign
{
dp⋆
dt
− dp
⋆
o
dt
}
= sign {2 (No(N +M)−NM −Nob) + b (2No(N +M)− 2NM −Nob)} .
To show that the last expression is positive, we can use the following fact: We know that
the aggregate quantity in a one-layer industry is larger than in a two-layer industry since
it is strictly increasing in the number of upstream firms. This implies that Qbo > Q
b or,
from (5), that (No − b)/No > (N − b)(M − b)/(NM) and therefore
No(N +M)−NM − bNo > 0.
But this obviously implies that the sign {dp⋆/dt− dp⋆o/dt} is positive.
Proceeding in the same way for the ad valorem tax yields
sign
{
dp⋆
dτ
− dp
⋆
o
dτ
}
=
= sign
{
Qbo(2N − b)(2M − b)(2No − 1− b)−Qb(2No − b)(4NM − 2(1 + b)(N +M) + b(3 + b)
}
.
The multiplier of Qbo is positive while the multiplier of Q
b is negative. We also know that
Qbo > Q
b. Thus, via setting Qbo = Q
b we underestimate the value of the whole expression.
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Nevertheless doing so and simplifying yields that the sign of the expression is given by the
sign of
2 (No(N +M)−NM − bNo) + b2.
This is strictly positive because the fact that Qbo > Q
b implies that No(N +M)−NM −
bNo > 0, as demonstrated above. 
Proof of Proposition 8
On (i): With the demand function p(Q) = 1 − Q the zero profit conditions can be
written as
M2(1− τ − t− c)2
(1− τ)(N + 1)2(M + 1)2 = Fd and
N(N + 1)(1− τ − t− c)2
(1− τ)(N + 1)2(M + 1)2 = Fu.
Totally differentiating both equations and setting dFu = 0 yields
dM
dFd
= −(M + 1)
3(N + 1)2(1− τ)
2ψ
and
dN
dFd
= −N(M + 1)
2(N + 1)3(1− τ)
ψ
, (37)
while totally differentiating and setting dFd = 0 yields
dM
dFu
= −M(M + 1)
3(N + 1)(1− τ)
ψ
and
dN
dFu
= −(M + 1)
2(N + 1)2(1− τ)
ψ
, (38)
with ψ = (1− τ − t− c)2M(2NM − 1).
Now inserting the demand function and its respective derivatives in dp⋆/dt given by
(31) gives
dp⋆
dt
=
2NM
(1− τ)(2NM − 1) .
Differentiating this with respect to N and M and using (37) and (38) yields
d
(
dp⋆
dt
)
dFd
=
(M + 1)2(N + 1)2N(2NM + 3M + 1)
(1− τ − t− c)2(2NM − 1)3M > 0 (39)
and
d
(
dp⋆
dt
)
dFu
=
2(M + 1)2(N + 1)M(NM + 2N + 1)
(1− τ − t− c)2(2NM − 1)3 > 0. (40)
In a one-layer industry dp⋆o/dt is given by
2Nop
′
o
(1− τ)(2Nop′o +Qop′′o)
.
Inserting the respective derivatives of the demand function simplifies the expression to
dp⋆o/dt = 1/(1 − τ). Thus, it does not change with Fd. As a consequence, from (39) and
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(40), we know that dp⋆/dt − dp⋆o/dt is increasing in Fd and Fu. It remains to show that
the absolute value of this difference is increasing in Fd and Fu. We thus have to show that
the difference always takes positive values, dp⋆/dt− dp⋆o/dt > 0. To do so, remember from
(20) that overshifting in a one-layer market occurs if b ≤ 1 and from Proposition 7 that
overshifting in a two-layer market occurs for a larger range of b than in a one-layer market.
Since in this case b = 1, it is indeed the case that dp⋆/dt > dp⋆o/dt.
The proof for the ad valorem tax proceeds exactly in the same way and is therefore
omitted.
On (ii): With the function p(Q) = 1/Q we can explicitly solve for N and M . From
(15) and (16) we get
N =
√
1− τ
Fd
and M =
√
1− τ −√Fd(1− τ)
Fu
. (41)
Since N ≥ 1 and M ≥ 1, we must have that Fd < 1− τ and Fu < 1− τd −
√
Fd(1− τd).
First, inserting the respective derivatives of the function into dp⋆/dt and simplifying
yields
dp⋆
dt
=
NM
(1− τ)(N − 1)(M − 1) .
Then, inserting the respective values for N and M gives
dp⋆
dt
=
√
(1− τ)Fd
√
Fu(1− τ −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
(1− τ)
(
Fu −
√
Fu(1− τ −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
)(
Fd −
√
(1− τ)Fd
) .
Following the above steps for a one-layer industry gives that No =
√
(1− τ)/Fd and
dp⋆o/dt = No/((1− τ)(No − 1)). Therefore,
dp⋆o
dt
=
√
(1− τ)Fd
(1− τ)(Fd −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
.
Thus, we get that
dp⋆
dt
− dp
⋆
o
dt
=
√
(1− τ)FdFu
(1− τ)
(
Fu −
√
Fu(1− τ −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
)(
Fd −
√
(1− τ)Fd
) .
Differentiating this with respect to Fd yields
FdF
2
u
(
3(1− τ)−√(1− τ)Fd −√Fu(1− τ −√1− τFd))
4
√
Fu(1− τ −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
(
Fd −
√
(1− τ)Fd
)2√
(1− τ)Fd
(
Fu −
√
Fu(1− τ −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
)2 .
36
One can easily check that this expression is strictly positive since Fd < 1 − τ and Fu <
1− τ −
√
Fd(1− τ).
Differentiating dp⋆/dt− dp⋆o/dt with respect to Fu yields
Fu
(√
(1− τ)Fd(1− τ −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
)
2
√
Fu(1− τ −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
(
Fd −
√
(1− τ)Fd
)(
Fu −
√
Fu(1− τ −
√
(1− τ)Fd)
)2 ,
which is also strictly positive because of the two restrictions above.
Again, the proof for the ad valorem tax proceeds in the same way and is therefore
omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 9
Since profits are zero in the long run, welfareW can be written as the sum of consumer
surplus and tax revenue, i.e.
W =
∫ Q
0
p(s)ds− pQ+ tQ+ τpQ.
Differentiating with respect to t yields
∂W
∂t
= p
∂Q
∂t
− p′∂Q
∂t
Q− p∂Q
∂t
+Q+ t
∂Q
∂t
+ τp′
∂Q
∂t
Q+ τp
∂Q
∂t
.
Evaluating this derivative at t = τ = 0 gives
∂W
∂t
= Q
(
1− ∂p
⋆
∂t
)
.
Thus, it is evident that welfare increases in t at t = τ = 0 exactly in the case of no
overshifting.
In the same way we can calculate the derivative with respect to τ to get
∂W
∂τ
= Q
(
p⋆ − ∂p
⋆
∂τ
)
.
So again welfare increases in τ at t = τ = 0 exactly in the case of no overshifting. This
holds for both the one- and the two-layer industry.
The statement in the proposition then simply follows by combining the results of Propo-
sitions 5 and 6. 
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Proof of Proposition 10
Calculating dp⋆/dτ for the case of upstream taxation in the same way as in the Proof
of Proposition 4 but now using (14), (16) and (17) yields
dp⋆
dτ
= 2
(p′)2 (p′Q(1 +N + 2M) + 2pM + p′′Q2)
(1− τ) [(4NM − 2)(p′)2 −Q2(p′′)2 + p′(p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′)] . (42)
At τ = 0, the equilibrium number of firms is the same independent at which layer taxation
is introduced. Subtracting (42) from (34), i.e. dp⋆/dτ in case of downstream taxation, we
obtain
lim
τ→0
− Q(p
′)2 (p′(1 + 2M) + p′′Q)
[(4NM − 2)(p′)2 +Q2(p′′)2 − p′p′′Q(1 + 2N + 2M) + 2Q2p′′′] , (43)
which is the difference in price changes between downstream and upstream taxation. As-
sumption 2 implies p′(M + 1) + p′′Q < 0 and so the numerator of the fraction in (43)
is negative. The denominator is the same as the one in (34) and since dp⋆/dτ > 0 it is
positive. Therefore, (43) is positive which yields the stated result. 
Proof of Proposition 11
We start with the function p(Q) = 1 − Q. Inserting the respective derivatives of
this demand function into (43) yields that the difference between a downstream and an
upstream ad valorem tax in a two-layer industry is Q(2M + 1)/2(2MN − 1). Similarly,
in a one-layer market, where Mo → ∞, we get that this difference is given by Qo/2No.
Subtracting the latter from the former and plugging in the equilibrium values for Q and
Qo yields that the sign of the resulting expression is determined by the sign of
1 + 2M2(No −N) +M(No + 1− 2N). (44)
Now using the zero profit condition for the downstream market in a one- and a two-layer
industry we get that No and N are given by
No =
(1− t− c)√
Fd
− 1 and N = M(1− t− c)√
Fd(M + 1)
− 1.
Inserting this into (44) and simplifying gives 1 + 2M +M(1− t− c)/√Fd > 0. Thus, the
difference is positive.
Now we turn to the function p(Q) = 1/Q. Again inserting the respective derivatives of
this demand function together with the expressions for N and M given by (41) into (43)
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yields √
Fd
(
2
√
1−√Fd −
√
Fu
)
4Q(1−√Fd)
(√
1−√Fd −
√
Fu
) , (45)
which is the difference between a downstream and an upstream ad valorem tax in a two-
layer industry. For a one-layer industry we get, by first lettingMo →∞ and then repeating
the same steps as above, that the difference is given by
√
Fd
2Qo(1−
√
Fd)
. (46)
We can now analyze the difference between (45) and (46). To do so we first simplify this
difference by setting Qo = Q. Since we know that in fact Qo > Q, by doing so we only
underestimate the value of the difference. Using Qo = Q, we get that this difference is at
least given by √
Fd
√
Fu
4Q
(√
1−√Fd −
√
Fu
)
(1−√Fd)
> 0,
where the inequality follows from the restrictions on Fd and Fu stated in the proof of
Proposition 8. Therefore, the difference is again positive. 
Proof of Proposition 12
We start with downstream taxation and denote the tax rate there by τd. We know
from the proof of Proposition 8 that
N =
√
1− τd
Fd
and M =
√
1− τd −
√
Fd(1− τd)
Fu
.
It follows that aggregate quantity can then be written as
Q =
(1− τd)(Fd −
√
Fd(1− τd))(Fu −
√
Fu(1− τd −
√
Fd(1− τd)))√
1− τd −
√
Fd(1− τd)
√
Fd(1− τd)(t+ c)
.
Proceeding in the same way for upstream taxation at a rate of τu yields an aggregate
quantity of
Q =
(1− τu)(1−
√
Fd)(Fu −
√
Fu(1− τu)(1−
√
Fd))√
Fu(1− τu)(1−
√
Fd(t+ c)
.
Now setting the tax rates in such a way that aggregate quantity is equal under both regimes
gives
τu = (1− Fd)−1×
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×
(√
Fd (1− τd) + τd − 1/2Fu − 1/2
√
ξ +
√
Fu
(
1− τd −
√
Fd (1− τd)
)
− Fd+ (47)
+
√
Fd (1− τd)
√
Fd+τd
√
Fd−
(
1/2Fu + 1/2
√
ξ
)√
Fd+
√
Fu
(
1− τd −
√
Fd (1− τd)
)√
Fd−
√
Fd
)
,
with ξ = F 2u − 4Fuτd − 4
√
Fd(1− τd)Fu + 4Fu − 4
√
Fu(1− τd −
√
Fd(1− τd))Fu.
Since these tax rates imply that aggregate quantity is the same under both regimes,
any differences in welfare in both regimes can only stem from differences in the tax revenue
and from differences in the entry costs. Calculating τp(Q)Q−FdN −FuM for the case of
downstream taxation yields
τd −
√
Fu(1− τd −
√
Fd(1− τd))−
√
Fd(1− τd). (48)
Repeating this for the case of upstream taxation we get
τr(Q)Q− FdN − FuM = τ(p(Q) + p(Q)′Q/N)Q− FdN − FuM
= τu − (1 + τu)
√
Fd −
√
Fu(1− τu)(1−
√
Fd).
Now inserting τu from (47) into the last equation and comparing it with (48) shows
that the resulting welfare under downstream taxation is always higher than under upstream
taxation. 
6.2 Appendix B
Proposition If the specific tax is restricted to be non-negative, then it is optimal both in
the short-run and in the long-run to raise a given tax revenue only via the ad valorem tax
and set the specific tax equal to zero.
Proof. We start with the short run. Consider a tax pair {ta, τa}, with ta > 0 and τa < 1.
With this tax pair the overall quantity is implicitly given by
(1− τa)
[
p+
p′Q(M +N + 1)
MN
+
p′′Q2
MN
]
− c− ta = 0.
Now consider another pair {tb, τb}, with tb = 0. This new pair gives the same aggregate
quantity as the old one if
(1− τa)ξ − c− ta = (1− τb)ξ − c
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or, equivalently,
τb =
ξτa + ta
ξ
,
where ξ = p+[p′Q(M +N + 1) + p′′Q2] /MN > 0. But the new pair {tb, τb} gives a strictly
higher tax revenue than the old pair since
Qpτa +Qta − τbQ = Q
(
p
(
τa − ξτa + ta
ξ
)
+ ta
)
= Qta
(
ξ − p
ξ
)
< 0, (49)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
p′Q(M +N + 1)
MN
+
p′′Q2
MN
< 0
and therefore ξ < p.
Now we turn to the long run. Consider a shift from the ad valorem tax to the specific
tax such that aggregate quantity and therefore the price stay constant,
dp⋆
dt
− αdp
⋆
dτ
= 0.
Using (30) and (34) to calculate α we get
α =
4NM
p′Q(2M + 2N + 1) + 4pNM + p′′Q2
.
Since aggregate quantity does not change, consumer surplus is unchanged, and the
change in welfare consists of the change in the tax revenue and in the fixed entry costs,
i.e.
dW =
dT
dt
− αdT
dτ
− Fd
(
dN
dt
− αdN
dτ
)
− Fu
(
dM
dt
− αdM
dτ
)
.
Since T = Q(τp+ t) and p and q do not change, we get that
dT
dt
− αdT
dτ
= Q(1− αp) = Q
(
p′Q(2M + 2N + 1) + p′′Q2
p′Q(2M + 2N + 1) + 4pNM + p′′Q2
)
.
From equations (28), (29), (32) and (33) of the Proof of Proposition 5 we get
dN
dt
− αdN
dτ
=
2N2M
(p′Q(2M + 2N + 1) + 4pNM + p′′Q2) (1− τ) > 0
and
dM
dt
− αdM
dτ
=
NM2 (p′(1 + 2N) +Qp′′)
(p′(N + 1) +Qp′′) (p′Q(2M + 2N + 1) + 4pNM + p′′Q2) (1− τ) > 0.
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Inserting the last three equations into dW , eliminating Fd and Fu by using equations
(15) and (16), and solving the resulting expression yields
dW =
2Q(p′Q(2M + 2N + 1) +QNp′′)
p′Q(2M + 2N + 1) + 4pNM + p′′Q2
< 0.
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